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Most analyses of the impact of expanding 
Medicaid focus on the direct costs of the pro-
gram from increased health expenditures and 
the direct benefits from improved health and 
reduced exposure to medical expenditure risk. 
In this paper, we consider possible additional 
impacts of Medicaid on enrollees’ labor market 
activity and take-up of government benefits such 
as disability insurance and welfare. As states 
face choices about expanding their Medicaid 
programs, these indirect effects could create 
important additional costs and benefits. A priori, 
however, the sign, let alone the magnitude, of 
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the effects of Medicaid on labor market activity 
and program participation is unclear.
There are a number of potential chan-
nels through which Medicaid coverage could 
increase employment and decrease participation 
in other government programs. For example, by 
improving health or reducing disruptive health 
emergencies, Medicaid coverage could increase 
employment, hours worked, wages, and earn-
ings. Higher earnings could in turn reduce receipt 
of benefits from social safety net programs, 
particularly those that are means-tested. There 
are also non-earnings channels through which 
Medicaid could decrease participation in other 
public programs. Improved health could reduce 
eligibility for disability-based programs. Public 
health insurance coverage might reduce the 
benefit from (and hence participation in) other 
programs that provide access to public health 
insurance (such as various disability programs). 
Some thus hope that expanding Medicaid will 
raise incomes, increase government income tax 
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revenues, and reduce government spending on 
other programs.1
However, it is also possible for Medicaid to 
reduce labor market activity and/or increase 
participation in other public programs. The 
income ceiling for Medicaid eligibility may 
discourage employment and earnings, and the 
insurance coverage itself may reduce the moti-
vation to seek employment to get health insur-
ance. Any decrease in earnings could in turn 
increase eligibility for, and hence participation 
in, other means-tested programs. In addition, 
participation in one government benefit pro-
gram (Medicaid) may increase participation in 
others by increasing awareness of the programs 
or by reducing the transaction costs of applying (e.g., Yelowitz 1996, McConnell 1991). Such 
channels have fueled concern that expanding 
Medicaid would reduce earnings and tax rev-
enues and further raise government spending.2
There is limited evidence available to gauge 
which effects dominate. Isolating the causal 
effect of Medicaid is challenging; individu-
als who are eligible for and choose to enroll in 
Medicaid likely differ from others in their labor 
supply and propensity to enroll in other public 
programs, and such differences are difficult to 
control for in observational studies. A set of 
circumstances in Oregon, however, provides 
an opportunity to evaluate the causal effects of 
Medicaid expansions on these outcomes using a 
randomized controlled design.
In 2008, Oregon initiated a limited expansion 
of its Medicaid program for low-income, unin-
sured adults, drawing approximately 30,000 
names by lottery from a waiting list of 90,000. 
Those selected won the chance to apply for 
Medicaid and to be covered if they met eligibil-
ity requirements. The lottery increased enroll-
ment in Medicaid by about 25 percentage points, 
while not reducing rates of coverage by private 
insurance (Finkelstein et al. 2012).
We use the lottery to conduct what is to our 
knowledge the first randomized evaluation of 
1 For example, the National Health Care for the Homeless 
Council argues that Medicaid expansion can break “a down-
ward spiral: illness results in loss of employment—and in 
turn, income, housing, and health coverage … Medicaid can 
break this cycle” (2013). 
2 For example, the Heritage Foundation argues “Medicaid 
expansion actually locks low-income workers in poverty 
because of its backward incentives that discourage work” 
(Senger 2013). 
the impact of expanding Medicaid on labor sup-
ply and participation in safety net programs, spe-
cifically cash welfare (TANF; cash assistance to 
low-income families with dependent children), 
food stamps (SNAP; financial assistance for 
food purchases for low-income individuals and 
families), Supplemental Security Income, and 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSI and 
SSDI; supplemental income to disabled indi-
viduals and their families).3 These are most of 
the major social insurance and transfer programs 
relevant for our population, with the important 
exceptions of unemployment assistance and the 
Earned Income Tax Credit. We do not expect to 
see effects on TANF or SSI, since eligibility for 
these programs would have already conferred 
Medicaid eligibility independent of the lottery (Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research 
2009). Using 2009 administrative data, we find 
that Medicaid has little if any impact on labor 
market outcomes or receipt of cash welfare or 
disability insurance, but increases receipt of 
food stamps.4
I. Background 
Oregon’s lottery allocated spots in its 
Medicaid expansion program for low-income 
adults who were not categorically eligible 
for the state’s traditional Medicaid program. 
Individuals in households randomly selected 
by the lottery could enroll in Medicaid if they 
completed the application process and met eligi-
bility criteria, including being: ages 19–64; not 
otherwise eligible for Medicaid or other public 
health insurance; Oregon residents; US citizens 
or legal immigrants; uninsured for six months; 
with income below the federal poverty level and 
assets below $2,000. The Medicaid program 
provides relatively comprehensive medical ben-
efits with no patient cost sharing and low or no 
monthly premiums. The lottery process and the 
Medicaid program are described in more detail 
elsewhere (Finkelstein et al. 2012).
3 SSDI pays if the beneficiary has worked long enough 
and paid Social Security taxes, and SSI pays benefits based 
on financial need; both confer eligibility for public health 
insurance (Medicare and Medicaid respectively). 
4 An online Appendix provides considerably more detail 
on our data and methods; it also presents all results dis-
cussed but not shown here, as well as additional results not 
discussed here. 
MAY 2014324 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
Prior work on the Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment has examined the impacts of 
Medicaid coverage in the first two years after 
the lottery, using hospital and emergency depart-
ment discharge records, credit reports, mail 
surveys, and in-person interviews and physical 
exams (Finkelstein et al. 2012; Baicker et al. 
2013; Taubman et al. 2014). We found that 
Medicaid increased health care use—including 
outpatient visits, preventive care, prescription 
drugs, hospital visits, and emergency depart-
ment visits overall and across a range of con-
ditions (including those most likely treatable 
in primary care settings). Medicaid decreased 
financial strain, such as the probability of having 
catastrophic out-of-pocket medical expenditures 
or unpaid medical bills sent to collection agen-
cies. Medicaid increased self-reported health 
and reduced the probability of screening posi-
tive for depression. We did not find statistically 
significant effects on measured blood pressure, 
cholesterol, or diabetic blood sugar control. In 
the case of diabetes, our confidence intervals are 
too large to rule out the decline in blood sugar 
that we would expect based on our estimated 
increase in diabetes medication and the clinical 
trial literature on the impact of that medication 
on blood sugar; in other cases, such as hyper-
tension, we can reject declines of the magni-
tude found in prior quasi-experimental studies 
of Medicaid. More information about the study 
design and results can be found in Finkelstein 
et al. 2012, Baicker et al. 2013, Taubman et al. 
2014, and on the study website www.nber.org/
oregon.
II. Data and Methods
All the analyses reported in the main text were 
pre-specified and publicly archived on January 
22, 2013 at hypotheses@povertyactionlab.org. 
Pre-specification was designed to minimize 
issues of data and specification mining and 
to provide a record of the full set of planned 
analyses.
We use 2009 administrative data to study 
the impact of Medicaid in the year following 
the 2008 lottery. We use data from the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) on annual earn-
ings and receipt of SSDI and SSI, as well as state 
administrative records on receipt of SNAP and 
TANF benefits. State administrative records are 
also used to measure Medicaid coverage. We 
matched our lottery list data to SSA’s records 
using name and date of birth from the lottery sign 
up. We were able to match about 85 percent of 
the approximately 75,000 individuals in the lot-
tery analytic sample to the SSA records; match 
rates were balanced between treatment and con-
trol groups. The state matched lottery partici-
pants to their SNAP and TANF records; we limit 
our analysis of these outcomes to the sub-sample 
that we also matched to the SSA data.
We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) models 
comparing outcomes among those selected in 
the lottery (the treatment group) to those who 
were on the list but not selected (the controls) by 
fitting the following OLS equation:
(1)  y ih =  β 0 +  β 1 LOTTER Y h +  X ih  β 2 
 +  ε ih ,
where i denotes an individual and h denotes a 
household. LOTTERY is an indicator variable 
for whether or not household h was selected 
by the lottery. We control for a set of indicators 
for the number of household members on the 
lottery list because selection was random con-
ditional on the number of listed household mem-
bers (Finkelstein et al. 2012). We also control 
for the pre-randomized (measured in the year 
2007) version of the outcome  y ih ; our results are 
not sensitive to excluding this control or add-
ing additional pre-randomization demographic 
covariates. All standard errors are clustered 
by household to account for intra-household 
correlation.
The coefficient on LOTTERY (β1) gives the 
average difference in (adjusted) means between 
the treatment group (the lottery winners) and 
the control group (those not selected by the lot-
tery); it gives the impact of being able to apply 
for Medicaid through the Oregon lottery. We are 
also interested in the impact of being covered by 
Medicaid. We model this as follows:
(2)  y ih =  π 0 +  π 1 MEDICAI D ih 
 +  X ih  π 2 +  ν ih ,
where MEDICAID is an indicator for having 
ever been covered by Medicaid during our study 
period (March 10, 2008 through December 31, 
2009) and other variables are defined as above. 
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We estimate equation (2) by two stage least 
squares using the following first stage equation:
(3) MEDICAI D ih =  δ 0 +  δ 1 LOTTER Y ih 
 +  X ih  δ 2 +  μ ih ,
in which the excluded instrument is the vari-
able LOTTERY. We interpret the coefficient on 
MEDICAID from IV estimation of equation (2) 
as the local average treatment effect of insurance (LATE) for the compliers (i.e., the subset of 
individuals who obtain Medicaid on winning the 
lottery and who would not without winning the 
lottery). The first stage impact of winning the 
lottery on Medicaid coverage is about 0.25, with 
an F-stat above 4,500. The first stage coefficient 
is considerably less than 1 because only about 
60 percent of individuals who won the lottery 
sent back applications, and only about half of 
those who returned applications met the eligibil-
ity requirements (Finkelstein et al. 2012). The 
LATE estimates require the additional assump-
tion that the only effect of winning the lottery 
on the outcomes studied is through its effect on 
insurance coverage. This may not be strictly true 
when it comes to receipt of SNAP and TANF 
benefits that can be applied for at the same office 
where one submits a Medicaid application; we 
discuss this in more detail below.
III. Results
A. Labor Market Activities
Table 1 summarizes our main labor market 
findings. It shows the impact of Medicaid on (i) whether the individual had any earnings (i.e., 
employment), (ii) the amount of individual earn-
ings, and (iii) whether individual earnings are 
above the federal poverty level (FPL).5 We find 
no statistically significant impact of Medicaid 
on any of these measures of 2009 labor market 
activity. This is consistent with earlier findings 
on self-reported hours of work (Finkelstein et al. 
2012, Appendix).
Our (statistically insignificant) point esti-
mates indicate that Medicaid causes a decline in 
employment of 1.6 percentage points (or about 
3 percent, relative to the control group). Our 95 
percent confidence interval allows us to reject 
a decline in employment of more than 4.4 per-
centage points or an increase of more than 1.2 
percentage points. We find a (statistically insig-
nificant) decline in mean annual earnings of 
5 We view the FPL as an interesting cut of the data (do 
the individuals earn enough to raise their households out of 
poverty?). However, as described in more detail in the online 
Appendix, error in our ability to measure the individual’s 
household structure means there will be a fair bit of noise 
in our cut-point. 
Table 1—2009 Earnings
Control 
mean
Intent-to-
treat
Local average 
treatment effect p-values
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment (any earnings) 0.5470 −0.0042 −0.0156 0.266
(0.0037) (0.014)
Amount of earnings 6,513.02 −51.74 −194.93 0.500
(10,227.30) (76.80) (289.00)
Earnings above FPL 0.1314 −0.0032 −0.0122 0.219
    (0.0026) (0.0099)
Notes: Earnings include wage earnings and self-employment earnings. FPL is defined using 
adjusted household size (see online Appendix for more details). Column 1 reports the control 
mean of the dependent variable and standard deviation for continuous outcomes (in parenthe-
ses). Column 2 reports coefficient (and standard error in parentheses) on LOTTERY from esti-
mating equation (1) by OLS; column 3 reports coefficient (and standard error in parentheses) 
on MEDICAID from estimating equation (2) by IV. Column 4 reports the p-values. All regres-
sions control for dummies for number of household members on the lottery list and the 2007 
value of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by household. All regressions are 
weighted to adjust for a new lottery that started in late 2009. N = 61,790.
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$195 (or about 3 percent, relative to the control 
group); our 95 percent confidence interval allows 
us to reject a decline in mean earnings of more 
than $762 or an increase of more than $372.
Most of the prior, quasi-experimental litera-
ture on the impact of Medicaid on labor market 
activities focuses on a time in which Medicaid 
eligibility was linked (or being de-linked) 
from participation in cash welfare. Gruber and 
Madrian’s (2004) review of this literature con-
cludes that there is little if any impact of Medicaid 
coverage on labor supply. Two recent papers, 
however, focus on the impact of Medicaid on 
employment in the absence of such linkages and 
find evidence that Medicaid decreases employ-
ment for pregnant women (Dave et al. 2013) 
and childless adults (Garthwaite, Gross, and 
Notowidigdo 2013). For example, Garthwaite, 
Gross, and Notowidigdo (2013) estimate that 
a Medicaid eligibility restriction that reduced 
enrollment among childless adults by about 10 
percent increased employment by 4.6 percent-
age points, suggesting that among those losing 
coverage, employment increased by almost 50 
percentage points—an estimate well outside our 
own 95 percent confidence interval.
These other papers suggest that the decline in 
employment associated with Medicaid coverage 
is related to the substantial Medicaid  crowd-out 
of private insurance that they estimate in their 
populations. By contrast, in our setting, we 
find no statistically or economically significant 
impact of Medicaid coverage on private health 
insurance (Finkelstein et al. 2012), suggesting 
that for the compliers in our experiment, private 
insurance through an employer is not an option. 
This lack of crowd-out may reflect the relatively 
low (100 percent of FPL) income eligibility 
criteria for our lotteried Medicaid program; by 
contrast, the Tennessee Medicaid expansion 
program studied by Garthwaite, Gross, and 
Notowidigdo (2013)  had no income ceiling, and 
about 40 percent of those covered had income 
above the FPL, with about one-fifth of those 
having income above 200 percent of the FPL. 
The lack of crowd-out in our setting may also 
reflect enforcement of the eligibility criterion 
requiring those selected to have been without 
health insurance for six months (although it is 
unclear how rigorously this was enforced).
B. Participation in Other Public Programs
Table 2 shows the impact of Medicaid on 
participation in the four public programs we 
measured.
The main effect is on food stamps (SNAP), 
which is by far the most commonly used of the 
Table 2—2009 Benefits
Panel A. Any receipt of benefits Panel B. Amount of benefits received
Control 
mean
Intent-to-
treat
Local average 
treatment 
effect p-values
Control
mean
Intent-to-
treat
Local average 
treatment 
effect p-values
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Food stamps 0.599 0.025 0.0950 <0.001 1,494.35 72.75 276.19 <0.001
 (SNAP) (0.0038) (0.014) (1,893) (15.75) (58.85)
TANF 0.031 0.0031 0.0117 0.042 111.36 2.62 9.89 0.659
(0.0015) (0.0058) (711) (5.94) (22.43)
SSI 0.050 −0.00024 −0.0009 0.888 30.63 0.25 0.93 0.821
 (0.0017) (0.0065) (137.972) (1.08) (4.09)
SSDI 0.084 0.0017 0.0066 0.222 943.19 14.43 54.41 0.405
    (0.0014) (0.0054)   (3,401.323) (17.33) (65.31)  
Notes: All outcomes are measured at the individual level except for “Amount of TANF” and “Amount of SNAP” which are the 
amount that the individual’s household received. Columns 1 and 5 report the control mean of the dependent variable and stan-
dard deviation for continuous outcomes (in parentheses). Columns 2 and 6 report coefficient (and standard error in parenthe-
ses) on LOTTERY from estimating equation (1) by OLS; columns 3 and 7 report coefficient (and standard error in parentheses) 
on MEDICAID from estimating equation (2) by IV. Column 4 reports the p-values. All regressions control for dummies for 
number of household members on the lottery list and the 2007 value of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered by 
household. All regressions are weighted to adjust for a new lottery that started in late 2009. N = 61,790.
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programs studied with nearly 60 percent of the 
control group receiving SNAP benefits. The 
reduced form indicates that winning the lot-
tery increases the probability of receiving food 
stamps by a statistically significant 2.5 per-
centage points (4 percent, relative to the con-
trol mean). It increases (unconditional) annual 
household food stamp benefits by a statistically 
significant $73; this is equivalent to a $3000 
increase in annual benefits for those who newly 
receive benefits, assuming that (as seems likely 
given the formula for SNAP benefits) all of the 
increase in benefits occurs through the participa-
tion margin. Naturally, the IV estimates of the 
impact of Medicaid coverage are about 4 times 
larger, suggesting that Medicaid increases the 
probability of SNAP receipt by about 10 per-
centage points (about 15 percent).
The IV results for SNAP need to be inter-
preted with some caution. Winning the lottery 
might have a direct effect on SNAP receipt, 
regardless of whether winning affects Medicaid 
coverage: if an individual applies for Medicaid 
in Oregon in person (rather than by mail), case 
workers are instructed to offer assistance to 
interested applicants in applying for TANF and 
SNAP as well. As an indirect way of gauging the 
extent to which the increase in SNAP stems from 
this “application” effect independent of cover-
age, we investigated the timing of the increase in 
SNAP relative to winning the lottery.6 The prob-
ability of becoming newly covered by SNAP 
increases in the first three months of winning the 
lottery but also continues to increase in subse-
quent three month increments for the whole time 
period we examine (out to 12–15 months post 
lottery winning). This suggests that while there 
may be a direct application effect, there are also 
longer-run effects likely attributable to Medicaid 
coverage itself. Since we do not find an impact 
of Medicaid coverage on earnings, the increase 
in SNAP due to Medicaid presumably reflects an 
effect of Medicaid coverage on increased aware-
ness of other government programs.
6 Conversations with state officials in Oregon indicate 
receipt of SNAP benefits is retroactive to the application 
date. Since individuals who won the lottery were sent appli-
cations about a month after the notification date, and then 
had 45 days to apply for Medicaid, presumably any immedi-
ate effect from applying would show up as SNAP receipt 
within the first three months. 
There is not much evidence of any impact on 
receipt of the other government benefits  studied. 
We find some evidence of an increase in the 
probability of receipt of TANF, but caution that 
this result is not only economically quite small, 
but is also less robust than the SNAP estimates.7 
We find no statistically significant effect on 
SSDI or SSI benefit receipt.8 Combining infor-
mation on benefit amounts in each of these four 
programs with the previous earnings results, 
we find no evidence of a statistically significant 
impact of Medicaid on measured income.
This pattern of results is consistent with 
hypothesized information or woodwork effects 
on program participation, concentrated in a pro-
gram administered by the same caseworkers 
and where, unlike SSI and TANF (that should 
have conferred Medicaid eligibility outside of 
the lottery), we expected to see a greater effect. 
There has been relatively little prior work on 
the impact of Medicaid on participation in other 
government programs. Most of the studies we 
know of focused on the consequences of sever-
ing a statutory link between participation in a 
given program and Medicaid eligibility, which 
is a somewhat different mechanism than what 
we are examining here.9
7 We do not find statistically significant increases in 
receipt or amount of TANF benefits when analyzed for a 
slightly different population and time frame; by contrast, the 
statistically significant increases in receipt of and amount 
of SNAP benefits is robust to the slightly different analysis 
sample (Finkelstein et al. 2012). 
8 Benefit receipt is recorded retrospectively based on the 
date the individual became eligible for the program follow-
ing a successful application process; data are current as of 
the end of 2012. However, in part because of concerns about 
lags between applications and approvals, we also (post-hoc) 
examined the impact on SSDI and SSI applications and 
approvals using SSA’s 831 files. We found some sugges-
tive evidence of statistical effect on SSDI and SSI applica-
tions, but not one that was economically meaningful (e.g., 
Medicaid coverage may cause about a 1 percentage point 
increase in applications to each program, and perhaps a half 
a percentage point increase in approvals for SSDI). 
9 There is evidence that de-coupling Medicaid eligi-
bility from participation in SSI reduced participation in 
SSI (Yelowitz 2000); it is not clear whether de-coupling 
Medicaid eligibility from the receipt of cash welfare reduces 
enrollment in cash welfare (compare Yelowitz 1995 and 
Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005). 
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IV. Conclusion
Using a randomized controlled design, we 
find no effect of Medicaid on employment or 
earnings. Our 95 percent confidence intervals 
allow us to reject that Medicaid causes a decline 
in employment of more than 4.4 percentage 
points, or an increase of more than 1.2 percent-
age points. We find that Medicaid increases the 
probability of receiving food stamps, but has no 
economically and statistically significant effect 
on receipt of TANF, SSI, or SSDI.
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